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# RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN COMMUNIST POLICY AND TACTICS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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## SUMMARY

The Communist Party of India has since December, 1947, abandoned its policy of cooperation with Leftist elements of the Congress Party and is currently fomenting discontent and advocating a popular rising against the national regimes in both India and Pakistan as composed of moderate and reactionary elements incapable of leading a genuine people's revolution. The new line regards as irrelevant questions of the accession of such states as Hyderbad, where the party is currently engaged in promoting a peasant revolution, and it is also responsible for the reduction of Communist support for India in the disputed affiliation of Kashmir. In order to escape the charges that the orientation of the Communist Party of India (CPI) was opposed to Pakistan, the CPI has approved the organization of an allegedly independent party in Pakistan dedicated to the same revolutionary objectives as in India.

The new policy is based on the Cominform resolutions of 1947 and on analyses of India and colonial areas in general by Soviet dialecticians -- Zhukov, Pavlov, and Zhdanov. It is a thoroughgoing Marxist-Leninist arraignment of bourgeois government, and constitutes a return to a doctrinnaire interpretation of the Indian situation which was abandoned by the CPI as long ago as 1933-34.

The revived emphasis upon orthodox Marxist-Leninist doctrines is designed to end the confusion within party counsels growing out of wartime compromises and long-term CPI sympathy for association with the Indian nationalist movement. With the voluntary surrender of British control, the original anti-imperialist basis for cooperation between the Communists and the Congress Party disappeared. The party now maintains that India and Pakistan achieved independence as a result of a conspiracy between the British and capitalist-bourgeois elements in both dominions designed to forestall any danger of social upheaval as desired by the Communists. The party's repudiation of all connection with nationalist groups was delayed for six

months until it had been demonstrated that neither India nor Pakistan would accord any thoroughgoing support to the Soviet bloc in the international field. A break with national Congress groups became virtually inevitable because of refusal of the nationalists to accept Communist cooperation in the trade union field, and because of their refusal to allow Communist participation in governmental operations.

The Communist Party is strongest in its leadership of unions composing the All India Trade Union Congress, until recently if not still the leading labor organization in India. They also control a fairly influential element of the Student Movement and direct the activities of numerous cultural organizations. They have also infiltrated various government services including military supply, and are active in a desultory fashion among peasants' organizations. Whereas the Communist party and program in East Pakistan is virtually indistinguishable from that in Indian West Bengal, the party in West Pakistan was disrupted following partition in 1947, by the exodus of Sikh and Hindu members and the unpopularity of the party's anti-partition stand. Hence the necessity of organizing an entirely new Communist party in West Pakistan. Communists in India occupy a strategic position in the field of transportation (dock workers, tram operators, railways) and in areas of industrial production generally.

It is unlikely that present Communist strategy will increase the party's political and economic influence or its numerical following in either dominion in the near future. The real Communist threat within both dominions lies in the opportunities afforded Communist expansion by increasing economic distress. This stems from price inflation, retarded economic activity, the refugee problem, and ineffective governmental efforts to ameliorate conditions. The party utilizes the services of a number of fervent men of ability who work for little or no remuneration and whose acknowledged devotion enhances their effectiveness. Observers report that the Communist party

attracts the ablest men among the younger political leaders. Tightening of the reins of party control at a time when opportunist manouvers had failed of results will strengthen discipline among this select cadre of leaders and afford a solid foundation for future operations. At the same time refusal to give consideration to factors peculiar to local conditions in both dominions will diminish the party's appeal to nationalist elements, while party enthusiasm may wane under pressure of enforced self-criticism on dogmatic grounds.

A question emerges as to why the Soviet Union has decreed this retreat to the defenses of orthodox Marxist dogma. The move brings the program in India into a larger measure of conformity with world Communist strategy and greatly simplifies the problem of controlling prolific Indian publicists who have demonstrated in the past a marked tendency to run off on tangents. The shift is also prima facie acknowledgement that the old anti-British line had lost its usefulness as a front for Communist operations in behalf of social revolution, which has consistently been the real objective of the party. Despairing of accomplishing popular revolution simultaneously with India's escape from colonial status or of enlisting Indian support for the USSR internationally, the CPI has elected to go underground. It will thereby jeopardize somewhat its leading role within organized labor and forego any chance to participate in constitutional procedures. But it can await the opportunity to capitalize on the debacle of capitalism and bourgeois government in India which is anticipated by orthodox Communist theorists. In case of world conflict, a highly disciplined Communist underground with strong trade union connections would probably be able to sabotage any effective Indian or Pakistan participation on the Anglo-American side.

February 1947 by R. Palme Dutt, an Anglo-Indian who has long been secretary of the International Committee of the British Communist Party. Dutt subsequently contributed two articles to the Peoples' Age, the CPI organ, in June and July 1947, calling explicitly for abandonment of the Communist quarrel with Congress Party governments. He advocated cooperation with all democratic and progressive forces within India in order to force Britain out and to enlist Pandit Nehru's continued cooperation with the USSR in the UN.[1]

Whatever may have been the level of policy authorization, the CPI's abrupt change of tactics during the late spring and summer of 1947 was noteworthy. The Communist-sponsored All-India Kisan Sabha (Peasants' Union) at its annual conference in May 1947 called off the peasant revolt and adopted virtually the entire ameliorative program of the Congress Party for reduced rents, improved tenancy rights, and easier credit facilities.[2] Peoples' Age began praising the historic leadership of the Congress Party in opposing British rule, in attacking the landlord problem, and in advocating friendly relations with the USSR. Industrial and transport strikes were abruptly abandoned, and Peoples' Age attacked management and police for trying to embarras Pandit Nehru by impending industrial production.[3] All progressive elements of the nationalist and working class movement in free India must cooperate, the Communists said, to achieve democratic advance and planned economic development.[4] Forgetting that Britain was not supposed to be willing to withdraw from India except under the pressure of mass revolution, the CPI joined heartily in the general celebration of national liberation on August 15. Only in the princely states did the party maintain its revolutionary agitation.

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1. Peoples' Age, June 13, 1947 and July 20, 1947.
2. OIR Intelligence Digest No. 15, August 28, 1947.
3. Peoples' Age, July 13, 1947.
4. Ibid., July 20, 1947.

# I. COMPARISON OF COMMUNIST POLICY AND SOVIET COMMENT ON INDIA DURING 1947

## A. Communist Policy Changes in Mid-1947

During 1946 and early 1947 the Communist Party of India (CPI) attempted to promote revolution throughout India, ostensibly as a contributing factor required, according to the tenets of orthodox Leninist dogma, to force Britain to surrender power in India. Party agitators fomented industrial and transport strikes, urged peasants in widely scattered areas to withhold payment of rent and taxes, and generally aggravated every expression of popular grievance. The Communists by such tactics eventually ran afoul of the police authority of nationalist governments in the several provinces, and in the end events demonstrated that their abortive efforts to promote revolution had no relevance whatever to British withdrawal.[1]

The acceptance of the Mountbatten Plan in June 1947 by the Congress Party and the Muslim League group cut the ground from under Communist leaders (of whom a considerable number were already jailed) and forced the Central Committee to revise the party line. In an attempt to bolster Moscow's efforts to enlist India's cooperation with the USSR in the international field, P. C. Joshi's collaborative policy was formally approved by the Central Committee at its June meeting, and later in the same month Secretary Joshi conferred with Sardar Patel regarding the terms of Communist collaboration with the nationalist government.[2] The importance of this international consideration had previously been impressed upon delegates to the Empire Communist Conference held at London in

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1. OIR-4339, June 4, 1947.
2. The Hindu, June 29, 1948.

The joint democratic front advocated by the CPI was intended to include all leftist political elements within India extending as far to the right as Nehru and Gandhi. The pictures of these two men were prominently displayed in successive weekly issues of the Peoples' Age. Special stress was placed on Nehru's alleged controversy with the Patel-led reactionaries in the government, on Gandhi's opposition to communal agitation, and on the advocacy by both men of a secular state guaranteeing equal status to all religious groups. One program of the CPI presented in early August called for the eventual nationalization of key industries, the establishment of a minimum wage, abolition of landlordism, within some specified period of time, close cooperation with the nationalist movement against the threatened alliance between Big Business and imperialism, and international collaboration with the USSR.[1] The agreed conditions for the CPI rapprochement with the nationalists apparently included the release of jailed Communist leaders, which was duly accomplished after Britain's surrender of power on August 15. During the orgy of communal strife which developed in late August and September 1947, Communist spokesmen reemphasized their support of Nehru and Gandhi as opponents of communalism. They condemned reactionary landlords, princes, Muslim League leaders, Sikhs, and the Hindu Mahasabha including its militant Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh Youth Corps, for encouraging communal excesses and for plotting the downfall of the Nehru government. Every progressive and democratic person in India, declared the Peoples' Age, must uphold the hand of Pandit Nehru in India and cooperate with the USSR on behalf of peace and the freedom of the oppressed colonial peoples of the world.[2] The followers of Nehru and Gandhi were

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1. Ibid., August 3, 1947.
2. Ibid., August 15, September 21, October 5, October 12, 1948.

exhorted to clasp hands with Muslim progressives throughout India, now allegedly disillusioned with the Muslim League; radical groups outside of the Congress Party were invited to accept Communist collaboration.

Preparatory to the 1947 meeting of the UN General Assembly, Peoples' Age stressed the significance of Soviet-Indian cooperation in the controversies involving South Africa and Indonesia and the consistent opposition of the USSR to British imperialism in such areas as Egypt. Commenting on the Canberra Empire Conference on the Japanese peace treaty held in late August, Peoples' Age declared that the USSR alone could defeat American imperialist plans to make a colony of Japan and monopolize Japanese trade.[1] Palme Dutt, writing in the London Daily Worker (October 8) supported Peoples' Age by pledging the support of "democratic opinion" outside India to Premier Nehru's determination to oppose further foreign intervention within India.[2] On November 9, Peoples' Age printed a special birthday tribute to Nehru featuring him as an opponent of communalism, imperialism and reaction, and as a friend of world democracy collaborating with the USSR and other "democratic" nations.[3]

B. Deterioration of Communist Relations with Nehru, 1947

Joshi's pro-Nehru emphasis received its first serious setback during the sessions of the UN General Assembly in October 1947. The leader of India's delegation was Mrs. Pandit, sister of Nehru. She came to New York from Moscow, where she had served a short term as the Indian Ambassador and had already became disillusioned over supposed Soviet friendship for India. A serious

1. Peoples' Age, August 31, September 7, 1947.
2. Hindustan Times, October 10, 1947.
3. Peoples' Age, November 9, 1947.

rift developed between the two delegations when the Indians contested with the Ukraine the vacant seat on the Security Council. The Indian press reacted in furious anger to Soviet insinuations that the Indian delegation acted under American orders. The Peoples' Age pointed out by way of apology that the USSR had supported India against Canada in the first balloting[1] and argued that although the Indian Government was justified in desiring a Council seat, it had erred in allowing itself to be used as a pawn by the US. In early November the Peoples' Age affirmed that India could not remain neutral in world affairs but must choose between the imperialist and democratic camps. Soviet pressure on the Indian Embassy at Moscow toward the same end meanwhile had produced negative results. Throughout November Communist propaganda in India continued to make the most of Indian-Soviet collaboration in the General Assembly with respect to South Africa, Indonesia, and to some extent Greece, ignoring India's open support of the American position on the Interim Committee of the General Assembly and the Korean Commission.

Developments in India were also not proceeding according to Communist expectations. The Peoples' Age did not conceal its chagrin when Sheikh Abdullah, the newly elected President of the All-India States Peoples' Conference, declined to appoint any Communist to his Standing Committee although he accepted a Socialist Party member.[2] The Communists were likewise making no progress in their efforts to woo the Socialists. The latter under the leadership of Jai Prakash Narain competed with the CPI in both the trade-union field and in student enlistment, refused to cooperate

1. Ibid., October 12, 1947.
2. Ibid., November 16, 1947.

with Communist agitation in the Indian States, and charged the Communists with being opponents of civil liberty, betrayers of India's unity, and agents of a foreign power.[1] Although the Peoples' Age persisted in demanding full interim recognition for the regime established by Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir, and in offering to assist Pandit Nehru's government in settling labor difficulties,[2] it was clear by December 1947 that the Dutt-Joshi policy had not produced the results desired either in the international or domestic field.

The first repressive action of the Bombay Government on November 29 in forbidding the Peoples' Age for one month to publish material relating to communal or states' matters, which was followed within two days by the arrival of Soviet Ambassador Novikov, apparently clinched the triumph of radical Communist elements calling for a change of policy.

C. Soviet Analysis of the Situation in India

The Draft Political Thesis prepared by the sessions of the Central Committee of the CPI held from December 7 to 16, 1947,[3] bears a striking resemblance to semi-official interpretations of the Indian scene prepared in Moscow during the previous six months as well as to the October declaration of the Cominform.

Calcutta's Amrita Bazar Patrika of June 9, 1947 reproduced a statement prepared by E. M. Zhukov, the Soviet representative of the Pacific Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, who attended the Inter-Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi in March 1947. Zhukov deplored India's poverty and squalor, denounced

1. D-461, New Delhi, December 31, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED; Hindustan Times, January 9, 1948.
2. Peoples' Age, December 21, 1947; T-257, New Delhi, April 2, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL.
3. The Draft Thesis is described in Chap. II, Sect. B, below.

the caste system for denying fundamental human rights, and commented on India's general illiteracy and backwardness in agricultural methods and the madness of communal strife instigated by reactionaries afraid of the masses. He also reported evidence of widespread sympathy in India for socialist ideas and love for Stalin and for the USSR as the country where racialism and religious hatreds were unknown. He told of outcastes who shed tears of joy and excitement when they shook the hand of this visitor from Lenin's country. Crowds attending the departure of the Soviet delegates demonstrated, according to Zhukov, their yearning for the comradeship of the Soviet peoples.[1]

A special session of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR held in June 1947 considered the question of the importance of post-war India to the future of Communism. Speakers agreed that a basic obstacle was the influence of the Indian bourgeoisie, who sought to preserve colonial standards of living for workers. The principal effect of World War II on India had been to weaken the workers and strengthen Indian capitalists. Britain recognized the impossibility of preserving the colonial regime as a British monopoly and had therefore decided to take Indian vested interests as partners. One spokesman expressed the belief that Hindu-Muslim enmity had not affected India's working masses, who were interested primarily in economic improvement and in ridding the country of British rule. Another denied that the Indian bourgeoisie were aiming at complete proletariat emancipation in South Africa and questioned whether they recognized that the Indonesian issue called for social reorganization as well as for national independence.[2] The entire trend of the analysis was to cut the ground from under the CPI's contemporary program of cooperation with the Indian nationalists.

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1. Amrita Bazar Patrika, June 7, 1947.
2. D-1865, Moscow, November 21, 1947; Gazette of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, No. 8, 1947.

In World Economy and World Politics for July 1947 Zhukov developed the thesis that the British, the princes, and the Indian bourgeosie, all fearful of mass democratic action, had entered into a deal to preserve intact India's traditional economic system along with Britain's military position. The only real foundation for Indian unity, according to Zhukov, lay in the class solidarity of the otherwise heterogeneous working class, who could expect little assistance from the disorganized peasants in breaking down the barrier of feudal-bourgeoisie cooperation. Gandhi had "poisoned the people with disbelief in their own strength" and enjoyed the support of Indian industrialists because he opposed reforms achieved by the people. Pandit Nehru's social position as a high caste Hindu and a millionaire, his support of the partition scheme, and his collaboration with Gandhi and Patel indicated to Zhukov his alignment with bourgeoisie elements favoring British connections. Zhukov also denounced India's bourgeoisie for entertaining premature ideas of appropriating the Pan-Asian legacy of the Japanese. With Japan occupied and China rent by civil strife, Indian leaders, in Zhukov's opinion, envisaged themselves as assuming the economic and spiritual leadership of Asia and as utilizing the agrarian economies of Indochina and Indonesia as the natural appendages to an industrially developed India.[1]

In contrast to this thoroughgoing disparagement of the Indian nationalist movement by a leading Soviet spokesman, Molotov, on August 15, congratulated Pandit Nehru on the occasion of the celebration of India's Independence Day and received Nehru's assurance in reply that in realizing India's international aims of promoting peace and justice he looked forward to cooperation with the Government and people of the USSR.[2] Other gestures of fraternization followed,

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1. E. Zhukov, "Regarding the Situation in India," World Economy and World Politics, No. 7, July 1947.
2. Hindustan Times, August 21, 1947.

including an invitation by the Mayor of Moscow to the President of the Delhi Municipal Committee to send a delegation to participate in the celebration of the eight hundredth anniversary of the founding of Moscow.[1]

Official Soviet tolerance of the Joshi-Dutt pro-nationalist policy was suggested in a news article by I. Pavlov appearing in the October 1947 number of Party Life, a magazine put out by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR intended for the guidance of Party leaders. Pavlov described accurately and in detail the CPI program and declared that the Indian Communists would cooperate with Indian nationalist leadership in creating a democratic republic. Only the reactionary bourgeois groups, capitalists, and moneylenders were condemned for cooperating with the British.[2] At the same time an article in the October number of World Economy and World Politics[3] argued significantly that "colonial" areas such as India might be able to bypass capitalism and move directly to socialism.

Soviet broadcasts to India during October and November 1947 changed their emphasis from attacks on British control of India to the advocacy of class conflict prosecuted by a peoples' front of workers, peasants, and intellectuals. Congress leadership was condemned indiscriminately for tending to go over to the side of the vested interests instead of the masses.[4] On the international level, Soviet broadcasts in November continued to appeal for Indian support of the Soviet Union in the UN on the basis of the South African issue and racialism generally. The Kashmir trouble during this period was blamed entirely on British machinations.[5]

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1. Ibid., August 28, 1947.
2. I. Pavlov, "Communist Party of India", Party Life, No. XIX, October 1947, pp. 60-70.
3. Vargas, World Economy and World Politics, No. 10, October 1947.
4. Survey of USSR Radio Broadcasts, No. 16, October 17, 1947, RESTRICTED.
5. D-422, New Delhi, December 16, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED.

During December 1947 and January 1948, the period in which the new orientation of the CPI was being worked out, the Soviet radio demonstrated no active interest whatever in Indian affairs.[1] Moscow pointedly refused comment on the Kashmir controversy which was before the Security Council[2] even though the CPI had previously taken a forthright stand in opposition to Pakistan's claims. The Communist press in London and New York, reflecting the time lag in policy delineation, continued for a number of weeks after the December reorientation of policy in India to reproduce the outdated pro-Abdullah, anti-Pakistan position of the Peoples' Age.[3] As late as February 5, the New York Daily Worker made a sharp attack on the communalist-reactionary Patel and posed the question of whether Nehru would accept the popular demand to break away and link himself to the left wing of the Congress, the Communists, and the labor movement.[4]

## II. THE NEW COMMUNIST POLICY FOR INDIA

### A. Timing of the Shift

The timing of events in connection with the formulation of the new Communist policy in India is significant. On November 29, 1947 the first ban on Peoples' Age was ordered by the Bombay Government. Ambassador Novikov arrived in India on December 1, and eventually presented his credentials on January 1, 1948. The Central Committee of the CPI held a secret ten day session from December 7 to 16 at which time the principal policy decisions embodied in the Draft Political Thesis were made. Information relative to Communist condemnation of the Congress Party, which leaked to the press,

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1. Survey of USSR Radio Broadcasts, No. 30, February 6, 1948, RESTRICTED.
2. OIR-4473.5, January 1, 1948; T-82, New Delhi, January 28, 1948.
3. London Daily Worker, January 15, 1948.
4. Bombay Chronicle, February 6, 1948.

aroused nationalist editorial attacks on the CPI as a tool of the USSR in furthering world revolution.[1] On January 14, 1948, the Moscow New Times discussed the basic argument appearing subsequently in the Draft Thesis and harking back to ideas contained in Zhukov's article of July 1947. It declared that Britain's partition plan was in essence a deal by which Congress bourgeoisie obtained Dominion status and power without incurring the risks of mass action for liberation, and that Congress conservatives preferred to maintain ties with Britain and to launch an offensive against Communist and labor leadership. India's bourgeois Government, according to New Times, had already demonstrated its incapacity to carry out even the most elemental democratic reforms.[2]

A. On January 25 the Peoples' Age reprinted a long report (nineteen full columns) by Zhdanov first printed in September 1947, on "The International Situation", which provided both the ideas and the phraseology of the original Cominform declaration of October. It exhorted all democratic, peace-loving people everywhere not to underrate their own strength and to resist enslavement at the hands of American imperialism under the Marshall Plan.[3]

The full text of the Draft Thesis was published in Peoples' Age on February 15. It is clear from internal evidence (comment on Gandhi's death) that it had been revised and brought up to date

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1. T-691, Bombay, December 30, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED. The following comment of Calcutta's Hindustan Standard of December 24 is typical: "For downright condemnation of the Congress the resolution recently passed by the Central Committee of the CPI is without a parallel....The statements are belied by the very vehemence of the denunciation. Those who have been asked to believe that nothing which the Congress has done or is going to do is right can hardly be expected to accept the basic assumption of the CPI that everything that Soviet Russia has done, is doing and is likely to do is absolutely right....The public will not accept so perverse an interpretation."

2. A. Dyakov, "Partitioned India," New Times, No. 3, January 14, 1948, pp. 3-8; also Moscow Soviet Home Service in Russian to Soviet Far East, February 18, 1948, citing a Trud article.

3. Peoples' Age, January 25, 1948; D-1709, Moscow, October 8, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED.

since it was originally drafted in mid-December 1947. Soviet Embassy officials undoubtedly scrutinized the document, and it is possible, of course, that during the two months' interim the statement had been cleared at Moscow. The document's strict conformity to the phraseology of the Cominform declaration of October[1] provides additional evidence of Soviet participation in its preparation.

B. The Draft Political Thesis of December 1947

The Draft Thesis followed straight Marxian dogma on a highly simplified pattern without introducing any significant qualifications growing out of conditions peculiar to India. The interpretation of the post-war international situation was presented as follows: The USSR emerged from World War II the acknowledged military champion of working class revolution as well as the example of what could be achieved under a state-organized economic system. Communist parties everywhere were much stronger than before the war, whereas capitalism both in Europe and in the colonies was on the brink of collapse. The opposing imperialist camp, led by the US, was bent on crushing freedom and independence of all countries. The acceptability to the Communists of all classes and leaders must therefore be judged in relation to their acceptance of the Communist affirmation that the US was now the open enemy of all mankind. All progressive elements must therefore oppose the American Marshall plan, which sought to save capitalism and imperialism, to prevent revolution, and thus to block the objectives of the USSR. Nehru's pretence of maintaining an independent role on international affairs was fully exposed by India's anti-Soviet votes on Korea, the Little Assembly, and the candidacy of the Ukraine for a seat on the Security Council.

India's and Pakistan's acceptance of the Mountbatten partition plan in June 1947 was presented in the Marxian context as a betrayal

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1. D-1709, Moscow, October 8, 1947, UNCLASSIFIED; Pravda, October 5, 1947.

of the revolutionary struggle within India. It involved a deal between Britain and bourgeois leadership of both dominions to turn over control to the latter, while leaving the capitalist-imperialist structure intact as a means of avoiding threatened revolution and of providing credits, capital goods, and markets for Indian industrialists. Thus the revolutionary program of 1946-47 had been nullified. "Henceforth the march of the democratic revolution will have to proceed directly in opposition to the bourgeois Government." As it was impossible for Nehru's Government to become the instrument of the people's will, the confidence of India's masses in his leadership must therefore be undermined by Communist groups through direct attacks and by infiltrating the Congress ranks and the armed forces. In reality, there was no difference between Nehru and Patel, although on the issue of Communist opposition to communal riots, it was admitted (in deference to Joshi's position) that a valid distinction might be made between Nehru and communal reactionaries like Patel.

The Joint Program of Action presented in the Draft Thesis advocated India's complete separation from Britain and the cooperation of India and Pakistan in association with the USSR both for economic development and for defense. The principle of provincial administrative reorganization based on the self-determination of culturally autonomous nationalities with right of secession was reaffirmed. Privilege based on caste or race should be abolished, and questions of accession of Princely states should be judged not on national bases but on their relevance to essential Communist aims. Other proposals included the outright confiscation of landed wealth and British holdings, and a radical purge of "unprogressive" elements in the civil service and the armed forces. As to cooperation with other parties and movements, joint action would be initiated on specific issues, but the CPI, as the core of the effort, would lead step by step until the total program was achieved. Struggle would

be the essence of the movement. Assistance would be solicited from the Forward Bloc and from malcontents in all leftist parties. Merciless ideological struggle would be waged against present Socialist party leadership.[1]

In an effort to indoctrinate party leaders with the principles of the Draft Thesis, the CPI's Politburo in late January sent copies to provincial and district committee chairmen accompanied by a covering letter. The Politburo's letter explained that the tendency of Communists in all countries to collaborate with reformist elements was carried over from wartime associations based on considerations of expediency, but that such practices violated orthodox Marxist-Leninist principles and must therefore be rooted out. Indian party leaders were exhorted particularly to take seriously the indictment of the bourgeois collaborationist line of the Congress Party, which could never produce democratic revolution. Among the five statements by Soviet authors recommended for reading by party leaders were two by Zhukov ("The Colonial Problem" and "The Indian Situation") and Zhdanov's treatment of the "International Situation," the latter being reproduced in the January 25 number of Peoples' Age. The Politburo affirmed that existing confusion within the party could be dispelled only by a "revolutionary understanding...based on Marxism-Leninism."[2]

In reinforcement of this pressure to return to orthodoxy, Peoples' Age also published articles taken verbatim from various Cominform publications.[3] The CPI in late January made an abortive effort, publicized in Pravda, to corral a group purporting to be the United Left Front of India and to secure their approval of the draft program.[4]

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1. Peoples' Age, February 15, 1948.
2. D-403, New Delhi, April 21, 1948, Enclosure.
3. D-146, Bombay, March 2, 1948, RESTRICTED.
4. D-196, Moscow, February 14, 1948, UNCLASSIFIED. From Pravda, January 31, 1948.

The assassination of M. K. Gandhi in late January afforded the CPI a respite of a number of weeks while public anger was directed against the communalist Hindu Mahasabha and its RSSS Youth Corps, whom Peoples' Age itself had vigorously opposed. The editor of Peoples' Age, Adhikari, acclaimed Gandhi's historic leadership in by-passing constitutional means of political reform and in arousing India's four hundred millions to the idea of mass resistance to imperialism. The real authors of the policy which led to Gandhi's death, he declared, were the collaborators with imperialism, Big Business, the princes, and communal reaction. In this policy, he added, Nehru also had acquiesced.[1]

C. Second Congress of the Communist Party of India

The convening of the Second Congress of the CPI at Calcutta on February 28 was timed to facilitate the participation of Communist delegates from overseas who represented the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Students' Union at the Southeast Asian Youth Conference (Calcutta, February 19 - 26), many of whom remained over for the CPI Congress sessions. The most important visiting delegate was Vladimer Dedier[2] representing the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, who made what was virtually the keynote speech on the second day of the Congress. Dedier stressed the importance to the "democratic bloc" of the continued resistance of India's masses to the machinations of British and American imperialists. He emphasized particularly the value of the fight waged by the Yugoslav Communist Party for organizational solidarity, unity of leadership, and iron discipline against all deviations and revisions of Marxist-Leninist theoretical principles.[3]

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1. Peoples' Age, February 9, 1948;
FBIB, February 9, 1948, Moscow Home Service, February 6, 1948. The position taken by Peoples' Age was an interesting adaptation of the Moscow radio's interpretation, which denounced Gandhi's doctrine of non-violent resistance, and alleged that the British themselves had instigated the assassination as a means of fomenting disorder.

2. Others were Radoven Zogovic of Yugoslavia, L. L. Sharkey from Australia, and Than Tun from Burma.

3. T-103, New Delhi, March 16, 1948.

All sessions of the Congress save one, a mass meeting on Calcutta's public square on the final day, were closed and secret. Six hundred and twenty-three delegates attended, representing a membership claimed to number 89,000.[1] Unreported by the account in the Peoples' Age of March 21 were secondary decisions to restrict party membership to those who proved their loyalty by six months work in party cells, to confine all criticism of Party policy to cell channels, and to declare that loyalty to the international Communist movement must lead Indian to fight fellow Indian if furtherance of the cause demanded it. Secretary Joshi's advocacy of a less restrictive membership policy and his proposal to oppose the government on specific issues rather than on general principles were rejected in favor of the more radical views of Ranadive, Adhikari, and Sen.[2]

The new General Secretary, B. T. Ranadive, presented the Draft Political Thesis to the Congress. He declared that the Party had been guilty of numerous reformist deviations based on bourgeois economic and political formulations such as constitutions and land reforms, while forgetting that radical change of the social order was required. Ranadive recalled the Leninist dogma that the revolutionary crisis in a colonial agrarian country such as India (formerly under British control, now under capitalist-landlord control) could not be solved without agrarian revolution. The collaborationist government, he added, must be unmasked and replaced by a peoples' democratic state representing workers, peasants, and exploited sections of the petty bourgeoisie. Every minor campaign against bourgeois elements must be regarded as a contribution to the realization of revolutionary ends.

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1. World News and Views (No. 13) reported that the 623 delegates represented 174 trade unions, 172 Kisan (Peasant) unions, 40 youth and student circles, 15 women's groups, plus 39 miscellaneous delegates representing teachers and cultural workers.
2. DX-13325, March 6, 1948.

Ranadive was very explicit in his criticism of previous policy. The Party's support of the anti-Fascist war against Japan, for example, had failed to comprehend that such action would strengthen the imperialist-feudal economy in India while the burdens of waging war would through inflation be transferred to the backs of the people. Thus the slackening of Communist attacks on the agrarian structure and the Party's anti-strike policy during the war period had played directly into the hands of landlords and capitalists. Secondly, in emphasizing Congress Party opposition to the CPI's principle of self-determination of various nationalities in India, the Party had in effect supported the demands of the Muslim League without making sure where the League stood with respect to the struggle of the masses against imperialism. CPI policy had thus supported Jinnah's partition demands, and had forgotten the Leninist dogma that different nationalities in a state such as India must be unified by cooperative action of their several proletarian groups. In the third place, even when the Central Committee in July-August 1946 ceased dallying with reformist theories and began to advocate outright seizure of power by the people, it had faced pressure by the end of the year from Joshi-led elements to abandon the revolutionary struggle against the Interim Congress Governments. This led eventually to the folly of the industrial truce and the servile bouquet-throwing to Nehru and Gandhi of mid-1947. Finally, Communist participation in the freedom celebration of August 1947 had failed to perceive the treacherous bourgeois-imperialist deal with its inevitable outcome in communal rioting. Ranadive concluded that, although Joshi had now accepted the new Political Thesis, he had resisted it strongly in the Central Committee and, in Ranadive's opinion, Joshi had not yet sincerely and completely accepted the new policy.

The details of P. C. Joshi's highly emotional reply were not reported in Peoples' Age. The ex-secretary allegedly professed

full acceptance of the new thesis and confessed his many mistakes of deviation, attributing them explicitly to a mistaken repudiation of Marxism and Leninism. The Congress subsequently struck Joshi's name from the proposed panel for the new Central Committee and elected a central commission of three to deal in the future with appeals in questions of party discipline.[1]

The Congress also made an important decision in favor of a separate Communist Party in Pakistan (CPP), overriding the opposition of many delegates to implied acceptance of partition. Bhowani Sen was the spokesman on this issue. As both dominions were dominated by capitalist-landlord reactionaries, he argued, the Communist revolutionary programs in both countries were basically the same. If Muslim discontent were to be exploited for Communist purposes in opposition to the growing power of Pakistan's ruling clique, it could not be done on the assumption that Pakistan was about to collapse. "Progressive" Pakistani elements must themselves be influenced to fight governmental policies and League leadership, assisted by a parallel "democratic" movement within India. Strained India-Pakistan relations only played into the hands of the imperialists as the Kashmir controversy had demonstrated. The only method of building a united Communist revolutionary movement within both countries, according to Ranadive, was to forget interdominion rivalry and to permit the emerging CPP to formulate its own program of attack against the unholy alliance between imperialism, feudalism, and bourgeoisie.[2] The character of this Pakistani Communist movement will be discussed in a later connection.

D. The Kashmir Situation Redefined

An important clarification of Communist-Soviet policy toward Kashmir developed in connection with the discussion of the proposal

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1. Peoples' Age, March 21, 1948.
2. Peoples' Age, March 21, 1948.

for a separate Communist Party in Pakistan. Sen insisted that the CPI had made a mistake in interpreting the advance of the Indian army into Kashmir as the action of democratic forces to protect Muslim peasants from tribal raiders. In reality that move had left the Prince, the landlords, and the army oppressors in control. From the correct Communist point of view, the accession question was irrelevant to the primary objective of revolutionizing Kashmir. The proper tactics were being employed in Hyderabad where the revolutionary spirit of the masses was being aroused. "The difference between Hyderabad and Kashmir," Sen concluded, "is the difference between our old understanding and our new."[1]

Whereas the Kashmir issue largely disappeared from the columns of the Peoples' Age after February, expanded coverage was given to revolutionary efforts in Hyderabad coupled with allegations that the oppressed peoples in the princely states were being betrayed by the States Peoples' Conference[2] (of which Sheikh Abdullah was President). This change of tactics correlated with the completely non-committal attitude on the Kashmir issue assumed by the UN Security Council Soviet delegation after December 1947.[3]

It seems clear that the CPI's abandonment of its original anti-Pakistan and pro-Abdullah position, which was explicitly acknowledged by Peoples' Age on February 29, was directly connected with the Politburo's decision to suppress nationalist partisanship in the interest of establishing a separate party in Pakistan and of promoting revolutionary objectives in both countries. Sheikh Abdullah, despite his known admiration for Soviet achievements and methods,[4] had obviously fallen far short of Communist expectations

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1. Ibid., March 21, 1948.
2. Ibid., March 14, April 4, 11, 1948.
3. Early Soviet SC delegation actions had backed India in opposing Pakistan's efforts to include the Junagadh and genocide issues.
4. D-277, New Delhi, March 29, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL.

in accepting Nehru's accession compromise and in muffing repeated opportunities to inaugurate a genuine peoples' revolution. Soviet opposition to the UN plebiscite proposal and the hesitance of Peoples' Age to criticize Sheikh Abdullah by name even when denouncing his Kashmir policy,[1] suggest nevertheless that Communist spokesmen have not lost hope that he may yet become the instrument of revolution in Kashmir. They entertain no corresponding expectations regarding revolutionary objectives on the part of the Azad Government of Kashmir or Pakistan.

E. Cleavage Within the Party

So opposed were the assembled delegates to any semblance of ambiguity that objection from the floor was raised to the phrase appearing in the revised CPI constitution designating as the party's objective mass revolution looking toward the establishment of a "peoples' democratic state led by the working class." An amendment sponsored by these critics of double talk added the clarifying phrase "for the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat." The Committee preferred the original wording, explaining that the "peoples' democratic state was in fact a specific form of proletarian-led alliance acting as the instrument for achieving the peoples' democratic revolution and the Socialist order."[2]

The newly chosen CPI Central Committee summarized the situation by charging that "the national leadership (Nehru, Patel, et al.) has struck a treacherous deal behind the backs of the starving people, betraying every slogan of the democratic revolution." The proposed constitution for India granted excessive powers to Provincial Governors, recognized no basic right of self-determination by nationalities, said nothing about the right to work, a living wage, or social insurance. Under it the people were accorded only

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1. Peoples' Age, February 29 and May 2, 1948.
2. Ibid.

the privilege of voting at long intervals, while the Government undertook to suppress peasants' movements and delay agrarian reform and nationalization of industry, and refused under the pretence of neutrality to collaborate with the world-wide anti-imperialist bloc. The bureaucracy must therefore be eliminated in favor of "elected officials guided by peoples' committees" and supported by a democratic army.[1]

CPI leaders have exhibited considerable sensitivity over the clash between Ranadive and Joshi. Even before the full account of the Second Congress was published, Joshi denied press reports that he did not subscribe to the new policy and that the party contained factions.[2] Ranadive subsequently declared that he entertained no "acute differences with Joshi", and insisted that the cleavage that existed within the party was not such as to divide the general membership.[3] Self-criticism reduced to personal terms was obviously hard for the Party's rank and file to accept.

## III. GOVERNMENTAL REPRESSION OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

### A. Early Actions by Provincial Authorities

Suppression of Communist Party activities, especially by the Provincial Governments, has followed the frank reorientation of the CPI as a revolutionary organization. Arrest of Party leaders in urban centers has been widespread. Repression was particularly severe in the Calcutta area and in Bombay, where strong Communist leadership occupied a strategic position in the heretofore dominant All India Trades Union Congress (AITUC) in transportation, textile production, and government services. Detention of Communist labor leaders pleased business interests and afforded opportunity for

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1. Ibid.
2. Peoples' Age, March 14, 1948.
3. D-201, Bombay, March 31, 1948, RESTRICTED.

strengthening the Congress Party-sponsored Indian National Trades Union Congress (INTUC) and incidentally the rival Socialist-led Hind Mazoor Panchayats (Labor Councils). One objective of the Government was to discredit the AITUC as the representative Indian labor group in favor of the INTUC.[1]

B. Preliminary Moves in Bengal, Bombay, and Madras

Passage of the West Bengal Security Bill (first proposed in December allegedly as a weapon against communalist, not Communist, agitators) in early January 1948 gave the Government power in times of crisis to arrest offenders on suspicion and to detain them without trial. Student-worker protests sponsored by Communists and the Forward Bloc delayed the measure for a month.[2] A general strike protest in early January backed by the Bengal TUC but not by INTUC or Socialist unions was ineffective.[3] Pandit Nehru's tacit support of the Security Bill was denounced in the Peoples' Age. In late December Bombay's Home Minister withdrew permission for a meeting of the Communist-led All-India Student Federation in Bombay on grounds of public security and authorized police action to break up the illegal assembly.[4] Scattered instances of arrests of Communists in the interest of public security occurred during January.[5] Late in the month the Bombay Government at the request of the Board of the Bombay Port Trust, which was supported by Home Minister Patel, adopted a very strong line in suppressing by ultimatum a strike in the Trust's Engineering Department.[6] More vigorous measures awaited the publication on March 21 of the decisions of the Second CPI Congress.

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1. Peoples' Age, February 8, 1948; A-150, Bombay, May 26, 1948, UNCLASSIFIED.
2. D-22, New Delhi, January 8, 1948, The nationalist Amrita Bazar Patrika, December 13, 1947, opposed the bill in this instance.
3. New York Times, January 6, 1948.
4. D-22, New Delhi, January 8, 1948.
5. FBIB, January 13, 1948, in New Delhi, RESTRICTED.
6. A-39, New Delhi, January 27, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL.

In Madras Presidency the Malayalam Communist organ was subjected in February to pre-censorship, and in early March a number of CPI organizations were banned.[1] Communist revolutionary activities in the Telegu-speaking Andhradesa section bordering the state of Hyderabad were responsible on March 12 for the extension for another year of the Madras Provincial Maintenance of Public Order Act. In many Telegu villages bordering the Nizam's dominion, governmental authority had apparently been superceded by "Peoples' Courts," which imposed punishments and fines.[2] Pandit Nehru took cognizance of the situation on March 15 in a public address at neighboring Vizagapatam when he demanded of the CPI a clear indication as to whether violence indulged in by Communist branches in Andhradesa accorded with party policy. Violence would lead to chaos and chaos to dictatorship, he insisted, whereas under democratic institutions parties could work for orderly change.[3] By the end of May 1948, the Madras Government was preparing to take vigorous measures to police the Andhradesa area adjacent to the Hyderabad border.[4]

The conservative nationalist view of Communist Party activities was expressed as follows by the Hindusten Times on March 17:

> "Evidence...is conclusive that...Communist parties act according to the wishes of the leaders of the Soviet Union...When they are weak, Communists make much ado about civil liberties but as soon as they come to power they have no hesitance in dispensing with them summarily... The Communist contention that those who do not share their faith should give liberty to the Communist Party to grow till it can effectively supplant and suppress them, is wholly untenable. [India's leaders] ...cannot afford to wait till all...farms and factories are honeycombed with Communist cells."

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1. D-403, New Delhi, April 21, 1948.
2. D-57, Madras, March 8, 1948, UNCLASSIFIED. The situation in Madras was complicated by intrigue on the part of an ambitious Congress Party Minister from Andhradesa to encourage CPI operations in Hyderabad and otherwise to use Communist pressure for political ends. D-81, Madras, April 5, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL.
3. D-179, Bombay, March 23, 1948, RESTRICTED.
4. T-40, Madras, May 31, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL.

C. Ban of the Communist Party by the West Bengal Government

On March 26 the West Bengal Government took the extreme step of suppressing the Communist Party within the Province on the ground that it was a threat to the public peace, that it interfered with governmental authority, and planned to seize power by violent means. The action was accompanied by a police order banning until further notice all meetings and processions which might be organized to protest the Government's action. The police also raided forty Party offices in the Calcutta area, including that of the Communist paper Swadhinata, and placed all the premises under seal. Some 180 persons were arrested including four members of the Bengal CPI Working Committee. An effort on the part of the tram workers union (AITUC-led) to stage a protest strike was ineffective because of refusal of Socialist-led elements in the organization to cooperate.[1]

A Central Government Employees' Union protest strike, similarly inspired, began on April 2, but proved abortive in the face of strong denunciation by Premier Nehru who described the strike as part of a larger political movement attempting to challenge the foundations of democratic government.[2] Pandit Nehru explained that the Government of India (GOI) had no intention of suppressing the Communist Party and that as the Bengal action had been taken locally without "particular advice from the Centre," it implied nothing with respect to India's stand on international politics. Communists, he added, would be permitted to propagate their views, but conspiracy to overthrow the government by violent means could never be tolerated.[3]

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1. D-203, Calcutta, April 2, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL.
2. FBIB, March 31, 1948, p. FFF 1-2.
3. FBIB, April 8, 1948. From a statement of April 6.

The West Bengal Government's action received support from nationalist papers which had criticized the less extreme Security Bill of the previous January.[1] Other papers were critical and asked the Government to furnish more specific evidence of the alleged Communist threat to the security of the province.[2]

D. Character and Effect of Other Repressive Measures

The repressive action taken by the Bombay Government on April 2 was somewhat less extreme, due apparently to restraint imposed by Dominion authorities. It came as a sequel of legislative action (March 31) requiring newspapers or periodicals to publish corrections of false statements.[3] Political leaders of the CPI such as Ranadive, Joshi, and Adhikari were apparently forewarned and escaped the police net by going underground, whereas important Communist trade union leaders including S.A. Dange, Member of the Legislative Assembly of Bombay and President of the AITUC, permitted themselves to be arrested. Simultaneous police raids were made in other industrial cities including Poona and Ahmedabad[4] and in East Punjab.

The Bombay Government did not suppress the Peoples' Age, and Ranadive, Adhikari, and even Dange continued to attack the Government's repressive policy through its columns. Dange attempted in vain to obtain release from prison by habeas corpus action, while Joshi reportedly fled to West Bengal where he is supposed to be directing an underground Asiatic Cominform organization with connections in Burma and perhaps in other Southeast Asian countries.[5]

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1. Amrita Bazar Patrika, March 28; Hindustan Standard, March 29.
2. National Herald, March 29; Statesman (Calcutta), March 31; Pioneer, March 28.
3. D-219, Bombay, April 5, 1948, RESTRICTED.
4. Also arrested were leaders of the Bombay TUC, the Railway Union, the textile union, the printing union, and the RIN Dockworkers Union. D-235, Bombay, April 9, 1948, RESTRICTED.
5. D-403, New Delhi, April 21, 1948, SECRET. Corroboration from other sources of P.C. Joshi's Cominform activities included the comment that he was by no means in disgrace within the Party and

The Party's new line was that the Government's adoption of fascist totalitarian methods proved its subservience to bourgeois-landlord reaction backed by Anglo-American imperialism, as well as its inability to stem rising popular discontent.[1] Pandit Nehru's prohibition of mass political pressure and his confinement of legitimate party activities to the propagation of views while waiting for the next election were denounced as contrary to the very essence of the new conception of democratic Communist Party policy. The Government's announced intention of not undertaking the immediate nationalization of established industries was condemned along with Pandit Nehru's assurances to foreign investors and his suppression of worker groups. With respect to Hyderabad, where the GOI and the CPI had a common enemy in the Nizam, Peoples' Age demanded that the Government arm the revolting Telengana peasants instead of fiddling over negotiations with the Nizam.[2]

The situation as of May 1948 was that the CPI and its local paper, Swatantra, but not the Communist-led AITUC were banned in West Bengal. In Bombay and generally throughout India individual Communists, particularly those in leading positions within AITUC labor unions were under police detention, although the Party itself was not banned and the Peoples' Age continued to be published. The INTUC and the Socialist sponsored Labor Councils were actively challenging the leadership of the AITUC in the labor union field.[3]

The Communist Party is currently conceded by its Socialist opponents to have nearly 90,000 members, and an organized worker-peasant following numbering 300,000 to 400,000. The Party's

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that his displacement as Secretary had been a purely tactical move. (D-413, New Delhi, April 24, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL). An earlier report in November 1947 that the CPI was participating in the formation of an Asian Cominform had been catagorically denied by Joshi. (D-22, New Delhi, January 8, 1948).

1. Peoples' Age, April 11, 1948.
2. Ibid., April 18, 1948.
3. D-207, Bombay, May 6, 1948; Statesman (Calcutta), May 2, 1948.

strength, however, lay not in its mass following but in its discipline, its recruitment of able youthful leadership, and its techniques of infiltrating labor groups, educational institutions, the armed forces, military supply services, and governmental administration.[1]

## IV. COMMUNIST PARTY POLICY FOR PAKISTAN

### A. The Problem Posed by the Creation of Pakistan

The creation of an independent Pakistan on August 15, 1947 posed a difficult problem for the CPI. During the war years, the Peoples' Age had afforded indirect support for the Muslim League demand for partitioning India by advocating the political self-determination of racial and culturally homogeneous areas throughout India. The Communists affirmed that the only way to allay the fears of minority groups and to avoid the rise of religious and sectional antagonisms was to concede at the outset complete cultural autonomy with right of secession. The development of an inclusive worker-peasant Communist Party organization on the Soviet pattern cutting across provincial, racial, and religious barriers would presumably provide under this system the basic political cohesion for the future Union of India.

This seeming Communist concession to Jinnah's "Muslim nation" theory was reconsidered after the Communist involvement in the Direct Action Day riots in Calcutta (August 1946), during which Hindu and Muslim Communists forgot their ideological affinity in the heat of communal partisanship. Thereafter, the Peoples' Age vigorously denounced Muslim League communal agitation and clearly reflected the anti-Pakistan bias of its editors. For example, it supported Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Pathan followers against Muslim League pressure

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1. D-247, Calcutta, April 29, 1948; Asoka Mehta in Amrita Bazar Patrika, April 18, 1948.

in the Northwest Frontier Province plebiscite of July 1947.[1] Subsequently Peoples' Age urged the Pathans to remain within Pakistan and to fight for anti-imperialist democracy. It also opposed the partition of the Punjab as calculated to aggravate communal strife, to provoke conflict, and to provide a base for British imperialist operations against India's "great peaceful neighbor," the USSR.[2] In striking contrast, Peoples' Age in dealing with Bengal completely forgot its concern for culturally autononous provinces and declared that partition was preferable to having all of the province go to Pakistan.[3] In the heat of the partition crisis of August and September 1947, Communist propaganda eventually turned the very principle of "nationality" against Pakistan by advocating self-determination for Pathans, Bengalis, Sindhis, Baluchis and Punjabis, and by supporting Bengali against Urdu as the official language of East Pakistan.[4]

The felicitations extended by the CPI to the new-born Pakistan state on August 15, 1947, were conditioned on the expectation that official Pakistani celebrations would be held on a non-communal basis as in India. Joshi pledged CPI assistance in restoring communal peace in Pakistan, but reaffirmed Communist support of all progressive elements of Pakistan striving for the abolition of landlordism, the nationalization of industry, and a "democratic" and republican (non-British) constitution.[5] The editors of Peoples' Age endeavored to be rigidly impartial as between Hindu and Muslim victims of rioting. They defended Muslims within India from intimidation and attack by Sikhs and Hindu

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1. Peoples' Age, July 13, 1947.
2. Ibid., August 3, 15, 1947.
3. Ibid., June 22, 1947.
4. Ibid., August 3, 24, September 7, 1947.
5. Hindustan Times, August 10, 1947.

partisans and appealed for funds to succor destitute Punjabi refugees, whether Hindu, Muslim, or Sikh, on both sides of the partition line.[1] The Peoples' Age condemned Sardar Patel's alleged appeasement of Hindu and Sikh communalists in India quite as vigorously as it did the allegedly reactionary and pro-British leadership of the Muslim League.

The nationalist bias of the CPI leaders was again clearly demonstrated in late 1947 by their strong support of Sheikh Abdullah's role in Kashmir in opposition to the Maharajah, the Muslim Conference, and raiding Pathan tribesmen. Peoples' Age declared flatly that Indian troops supporting Sheikh Abdullah's Emergency regime were defending democracy and the freedom of the Kashmir people and that every democrat and honest man must support Kashmir against "enemy" invaders from Pakistan.[2] Pakistan's Premier, Liaquat Ali Khan, was condemned for fomenting communal disruption in Jammu and Kashmir and for supporting imperialist agents who sought to grab Chitral and Gilgit for use as military bases against the USSR. As late as December 21, Peoples' Age was demanding that the Maharajah accorded Sheikh Abdullah's regime the full powers of an Interim Government.[3]

The appointment of Sir Zafrullah Khan as Pakistan's Foreign Minister in early January 1948 was the occasion for the explicit Communist charge that Pakistan had gone over to the British camp. In support of the accusation the paper cited Zafrullah's pro-British record, the recent efforts of Pakistan's special emissary to the Near East, Feroz Khan Noon, to establish closer ties with anti-Soviet States, particularly Turkey and Transjordan, the retention of British advisors in Pakistan's Army and Foreign Office,

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1. Peoples' Age, September 7, 28, and October 5, 1947.
2. Ibid., November 9 and 16, December 21, 1947.
3. Ibid., November 16, and December 21, 1947.

and the voting record of Pakistan delegates who supported the Anglo-American bloc on all key issues arising in the UN General Assembly.[1]

The resentment aroused in Muslim leftist circles, particularly in West Pakistan, by the pro-nationalist bias of the CPI apparently alienated many Punjabi Communists. The Peoples' Age of October 19 commented gloomily that patriotic anti-imperialist Muslim youth in West Pakistan were now refusing to unite with worker groups to foil the British imperialist plot in Pakistan, and were instead being swayed by communal hatred and talk of war with India.[2] The exodus of Sikh and Hindu Communists from all West Pakistan completed the wrecking of the pre-partition Communist organization within the Punjab.[3] A splinter Pakistan Communist Party, sponsored by Abdul Qadir Khan, a peasant union leader, as early as June 1947 was roundly denounced in Peoples' Age as being both unorthodox and anti-Communist in character. Abdul Qadir's group again assembled in Karachi on February 26, 1948, this time with the implied blessing of the Pakistan Government, only to be similarly blasted as unauthorized by regular Communist leaders.[4]

Meanwhile, in Nakodar, East Punjab, a Sikh-sponsored conference of 300 delegates, meeting in early January 1948, projected another splinter group, the "Lal Communist Party Hind Union." The resolutions of the Sikh conference significantly omitted reference to the anti-communal position of the CPI, but condemned the invasion of Kashmir by Pakistan raiders, criticized the CPI itself for being non-Marxist, non-revolutionary, and anti-national, and sent congratulatory greetings to the Cominform for its bold

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1. Ibid., January 4, 1948.
2. Ibid., October 19, 1947.
3. REF-329.545, AE 3433S.
4. REF-335.4, AE 3413S.

anti-imperialist stand.[1] If the orthodox Communist cause was to be revived in West Pakistan, the disrupted CPI could scarcely be expected under the circumstances to accomplish the task.

B. Soviet Evaluation of the Pakistan Situation

The writings of Soviet spokesmen with respect to Pakistan during 1947 gave only qualified support to the strongly anti-Muslim League position adopted by the CPI. In Zhukov's July 1947 estimate of the "Situation in India," already referred to, he declared that Jinnah was "more British than the British." He nevertheless suggested that the Muslim League rank and file attached little significance to religious considerations and were basically opposed to the caste system, to Hindu cultural domination, and to British rule. He also expressed the belief that Muslim peoples throughout northern India would be strongly influenced by anti-British propaganda from the Arab Near East, and would be appreciative of the Soviet concept of autonomous nationalities. The CPI, he reaffirmed, should oppose any forcible uniting of diverse nationalities in India. Despite the admitted presence of reactionary leaders in the Muslim League, Zhukov denied that the Congress Party could properly be designated as progressive and the League as reactionary, an observation repeated verbatim by Sen during the Second CPI Congress.[2]

By January 1948 Soviet spokesmen were avoiding direct criticism of Pakistan as such and were placing all possible blame on British governors and military advisers for the Indian-Pakistan embroilment over Kashmir. The British were encouraging Pathan tribesmen to invade Jammu and Kashmir in an endeavor to transform Pakistan into a British military base similar to Transjordan.

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1. Hindustan Times, January 15, 1948. Leaders of the Sikh Conference were Dr. Blag Singh and Sardar Brijha Singh, who headed a Central Committee of seven members.
2. Zhukov, "Regarding the Situation in India," World Economy and World Politics, July 1947.

Soviet writers admitted that reactionary elements in Pakistan were stronger than in India, but still indicated hope that disillusioned "democratic" malcontents within the Muslim League such as Iftikharuddin, backer of the Russophile Pakistan Times and until November 1947 President of the Punjab Muslim League, would assert themselves.[1]

C. The Communist Party in East Pakistan

Communist Party activities in East Pakistan were less inhibited than in the Punjab partly because the party was more firmly rooted in Bengal. On September 27-28, 1947, the CPI sponsored an East Pakistan Labor Conference at Dacca, which affirmed the customary Communist thesis that Britain and Indian vested interests, with the connivance of the East Pakistan Government, were fomenting the communal riots in order to disrupt working class unity.[2] Other East Pakistan Communist agitators, especially in Dacca, sponsored effective demonstrations during the early months of 1948[3] against the Jinnah-supported East Pakistan government. A mild sort of repression began on March 14, when East Pakistan police authorities searched Communist Party offices and residences in Dacca and arrested two CPI workers.[4]

The position of the CPI in East Bengal is complicated by the infiltration of rival revolutionary groups[5] whose tactics are almost indistinguishable from those of the CPI. The East Pakistan branch of the CPI is probably stronger than any other single group, with some 6,000 members. The Party is active in a number of

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1. A. Dyakov, "Partitioned India," New Times, No. 3, January 14, 1944, pp. 8-9.
2. Ibid., October 19, 26, 1947. The Conference also advocated that the jute industry of East Pakistan--growers, river-men, and workers--be reorganized on a cooperative basis.
3. D-191, Calcutta, March 27, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL.
4. Hindustan Times, March 14, 1948.
5. Such as the Trotskyite Bolshevik Party of India, the Revolutionary Socialist Party of India, and four or five other left-wing terrorist groups. D-191, Calcutta, March 27, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL.

agricultural areas as well as in the government services unions (railway, postal, and telegraph employees), and among university students and industrial workers. Local non-Communist political leaders, (e.g. Suhrawardy) seeking to embarrass the Government have established on occasion temporary liaison with the CPI with a view to exploiting its nuisance value.

In contrast to the situation in West Pakistan, there is at present no apparent reason, from the Communist point of view, for organizing a separate Communist Party in East Pakistan. The Party in East Pakistan is well established with a trained, disciplined cadre of workers whose influence is multiplied by their wide connections with all discontented elements of the population. The Party capitalizes on Bengali Muslim resentment over Karachi's efforts to adopt Urdu as the official Pakistan language and over the presence of non-Bengali Government employees.[1] Individual Communist leaders have been arrested but the CPI continues its activities, particularly in the labor field, strengthened no doubt by underground assistance from West Bengal.[2]

D. Revival of Communist Party Activities in West Pakistan

For several months following the outbreak of widespread rioting in the Punjab in the fall of 1947, Communists concentrated their attention on refugee groups with little apparent success. Eventually displaced Muslims within Pakistan (one million in the Punjab, 500,000 in Sind, and 100,000 in the North West Frontier Province) became discontented over the Government's ineffectual

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1. D-191, Calcutta, March 27, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL. Dacca was the only place in Pakistan where a strike of government workers took place on April 8 in sympathy with the simultaneous strike by the same groups in West Bengal.
2. Amrita Bazar Patrika, May 5, 1948.

efforts to relieve their distress and afforded agitators a more fertile field of operation. An attempt to coalesce worker and refugee elements was made at Lahore in early December 1947, when one Mirza Mohamed Ibrahim, president of the North-Western Railway Trade Union and also of the West Pakistan TUC, organized a procession of protesting railway workers which all unemployed and homeless elements were invited to join. Slogans demanding a fully independent and democratic Pakistan, abolition of landlordism, distribution of land to cultivators, and state ownership of key industries reflected the Communist inspiration of the demonstration.[1] A month later the same Ibrahim assembled a meeting of assorted union delegates at Lahore to organize a Pakistan Trade Union Federation covering both East and West Pakistan. The group adopted the All India Trade Union Congress constitution with amendments. Ibrahim became the president; one vice-president would be chosen from the North West Frontier Province, two from the Punjab, and two from East Pakistan. The Federation thereupon demanded immediate recognition by the Government as the only central labor organization in the country entitled to representation in the Constituent Assembly and Provincial Assemblies.[2] Thus, a separate Communist-led Pakistan trade union organization was projected in early 1948.

E. The New Pakistan Communist Party

The final decision to organize a separate Communist Party for West Pakistan was apparently reached with considerable reluctance.[3] The matter was not mentioned in the original version of the Draft Political Thesis published on February 15. In late February,

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1. Peoples' Age, January 4, 1948.
2. Ibid., February 8, 1948.
3. Joshi denied in July and August 1947 that a separate Pakistan party would be formed, and AITUC leaders in September appealed for unity of the labor movement irrespective of frontiers or other artificial barriers. Free Press Journal, July 19, 1947; WD, T-CDA 56, New Delhi, August 4, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL; FBIB, September 11, 1947.

Jamaluddin H. Bokhari, Karachi labor leader and correspondent of Peoples' Age, denounced as unauthorized the proposal of the Sind Peasants' Committee led by Abdul Qadir Khan to convene a meeting on February 26 to form a Pakistan Communist Party, and declared that such a meeting was officially scheduled for April.[1] But apparently neither Bokhari nor Shaukat Usmani, both Karachi Communists of long standing,[2] was commissioned to inaugurate the new Communist Party for Pakistan. Bokhari's arrest by Sind police on April 17 for inciting a dock workers' strike may have been timed to hamper the work of his projected April meeting.[3]

The actual organization of the CPP appears to have been a quiet operation headed by Sajjd Zaheer, AITUC representative, who came from New Delhi and worked in close cooperation at Lahore with Mirza Ibrahim of the Pakistan Trades Union Federation. The organization is rudimentary and the work is being hampered by arrests of labor union leaders and other Communist-line promoters throughout Sind and the Punjab.[4]

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1. D-107, Karachi, March 6, 1948. Abdul Qadir's convention consisting of around a hundred members apparently centered its attention on Sind peasant problems, including a proposal to settle Muslim refugees on land taken over from large estates. The group also supported independence for Pakistan, adult suffrage, provincial organization on linguistic lines, and repeal of repressive laws. Dawn's support of Abdul Qadir's program as well as its backing by a Parliamentary Secretary of the Sind Government stamps it as a local program unconnected with the Comintern.

2. D-166 and 193, Karachi, April 17 and 30, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL. Bokhari is Secretary of the Sind CP Committee, President of the Sind TUC, and President of the Karachi Hawker's Union. Usmani is a Party member of long standing who writes CP line articles for the Sind Observer and was a co-defendant with Dange in the famous Cawnpore Conspiracy Case in the 1920's.

3. T-246, Karachi, May 4, 1948, SECRET; D-166, Karachi, April 17, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL. The Communist Party office at Karachi located adjacent to the Pakistan Trade Union Federation headquarters, was in March 1948, a dingy affair lacking both furniture and supplies. See D-136, Karachi, March 23, 1948.

4. D-178, Karachi, April 23, 1948. Arrests in Sind on April 17 included six Communist leaders of labor unions. In Lahore, the editor and publisher of the Pakistan Times was arrested on April 17.

In view of the continuing ties between Pakistan Communists and the AITUC leadership in India, the question arises as to how real has been the separation of the two Communist parties. The Pakistan Government has exploited the connection effectively by denouncing all Communist agitators in Pakistan as fifth columnists from India seeking to subvert Pakistan government employees and thus to paralyze the administration and destroy Pakistan. Local government agencies have been exhorted to sweep all infiltrating Communists from civil and military posts.[1] The desirability from the Communist point of view of countering the accusation of Muslim League leaders that Communist activities in West Pakistan constituted in reality an India-sponsored anti-Pakistan plot forced the CPI Congress formally to divorce the Communist movement in Pakistan. The persistence of inter-dominion rivalry will in all probability contribute to divergence in the viewpoint of the two parties in course of time.

F. Assessment of the Communist Movement in Pakistan

The economic and administrative vulnerability of the West Pakistan regime affords Communist agitators ample scope. Distress among the refugee groups is growing. Although trade union strength is small and peasant organizations rudimentary, popular dissatisfaction is mounting over governmental corruption and inefficiency on the local level. The infant labor movement finds virtually its only encouragement from Communist organizers in a situation where labor grievances are real.[2]

The unexpected decision of the Government of Pakistan in mid-April to initiate the move to exchange ambassadors with the USSR[3]

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1. R-66, Karachi, April 17, 1948. Speech by Liaquat Ali Khan on April 12.

2. T-228, Karachi, April 19, 1948; D-178, Karachi, April 23, 1948.

3. D-139, Karachi, March 27, 1948, reported that no effort to establish relations with the USSR would be made.

must be viewed in the light of the concurrent action of the Sind and Punjab Governments in arresting Communist leaders of important labor unions. The decision to establish diplomatic relations was undoubtedly intended as a warning to the Anglo-American bloc not to presume too much on Pakistan's friendship.[1] It might also be designed to facilitate Pakistan's trade with the USSR and the satellite countries, especially Czechoslovakia. Jinnah might feel also that an increase of Soviet and Communist activity within Pakistan[2] would improve somewhat his country's bid for American diplomatic and economic assistance.[3]

The prospect of any thoroughgoing Pakistan alignment with the Soviet bloc in the near future or of any considerable military aid to Pakistan by USSR would seem to be extremely remote. A change has nevertheless been noticed. Although recently Moscow papers and Cominform agencies have vigorously condemned the suppression by Indian provincial governments of labor leaders and Communists, allegedly at the behest of the US, the same agencies make no reference to similar repressive actions in Pakistan[4] or to the complete absence of any Pakistan representation at such meetings as the World Federation of Trade Union sessions at Rome.[5]

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1. The difficult attitude taken initially by the Pakistan delegate to UN Balkan Commission is also relevant to this purpose.
2. D-201, Karachi, May 4, 1948.
3. See editorial in Dawn, May 4, 1948. The only positive move on Pakistan's part appears to be an attempt to draw closer to Muslim countries of the Near East.
4. FBIB, May 20, 1948, p. CC 1, RESTRICTED; T-626, Belgrade, May 20, 1948, RESTRICTED. Favorable Soviet treatment of Pakistan is observable in the omission of that country from the Moscow radio's list of thirteen nations which were destroying the trade movement or severely imparing the rights of labor. Iran, India, Ceylon, Burma and Malaya were included. Weekly Survey of USSR Radio broadcasts, May 20-26, 1948, RESTRICTED.
5. A-191, Karachi, May 18, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL.

## V. CONCLUSION

The real Communist threat within both India and Pakistan lies in the opportunities afforded Communist expansion by increasing economic distress arising from price inflation and retarded economic activity, the refugee problem, and ineffective governmental efforts at ameliorating conditions. From various sources comes the observation that leftist movements in both countries are attracting the ablest men among the young political leaders, and that the Communists get the cream.[1] The party utilizes the services of a number of fervent men of ability who work for little or no remuneration and whose devotion adds greatly to their effectiveness in spreading party doctrines.[2] The current tightening of the reins of Party control by Moscow and insistence on doctrinnaire Marxian dogma strengthens the Communist movement from a disciplinary point of view, but it also creates tensions by giving scant recognition to factors peculiar to local conditions in both dominions. The formation of a separate party in Pakistan will ease some tensions and aggravate others. Party enthusiasm may wane under pressure of enforced self-criticism on dogmatic bases unrelated to nationalist ends.

A question emerges as to why the Soviet Union has adopted such a strict Marxian line in India and Pakistan. The impact of Cominform policy in bringing the CPI into a larger measure of conformity with world Communist strategy is apparent in the presence at the Second Congress of the Yugoslav leader Dedier, and in the undoubted influence of Novikov in preparing a Draft Political Thesis similar in so many respects to the initial

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1. A-682, London, March 22, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL; CIA-00-B-1742, December 1947.
2. D-399, New Delhi, December 11, 1947, CONFIDENTIAL, citing a statement by Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar.

Cominform Declaration of October 1947. The tightening of Moscow's leash on the CPI is basically a retreat to fundamental Communist dogma at a time when opportunist maneuvers had failed to produce desired results and confusion threatened in party circles. The shift indicates furthermore that the old anti-British nationalist line had lost its usefulness as a front for the Communist operations in behalf of social revolution, which has consistently been the real objective of the Party. Despairing of accomplishing popular revolution simultaneously with India's escape from colonial status or of enlisting Indian support of the USSR internationally, the CPI has elected to go underground. It will thereby forego any chance to participate in constitutional procedures but will probably await the opportunity to capitalize on the debacle of capitalism and bourgeois government in India which may be anticipated by orthodox Communist theorists. A highly disciplined underground movement retaining its connections with the All India Trade Union Congress would probably be able meanwhile to sabotage in the transportation field particularly, any proposed Indian or Pakistan participation on the Anglo-American side in case of world conflict.